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We propose two principles that should be followed in the study of automaticity for cognitive 
processes. Both follow from the general rule that experimental research should be guided by a 
mode1 of the task in question, frequently a process model. The first is that the concept of 
automaticity is best applied to component processes of complex behaviors rather than to behaviors 
as a whole. The second is that the criteria chosen for the identification of automaticity should be 
motivated by the processes in question. Examples are discussed of research programs that are 
relevant to each principle. 
During the past several years, there has been a good deal of concern 
about the automaticity of cognitive processes. This concern has been 
evident in two sorts of research programs. One is motivated by the goal 
of identifying cognitive processes that are automatic, and by describing 
the role that these processes play in cognition. The other has focused on 
the development of automaticity through training. Research programs 
concerned with either issue need to be preceded by a clear idea of the 
mental events for which the concept of automaticity is potentially 
appropriate, and a set of criteria that will be both necessary and 
sufficient to identify automaticity when it is encountered. The purpose 
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of this paper is to articulate two principles that ought to be followed in 
meeting these needs. Both principles follow directly from the general 
heuristic that empirical research should be guided by a model of the 
experimental task in question. In the case of research concerned with 
automaticity, a process model is frequently the one of choice. Such a 
model typically provides both a clear statement of the processes in- 
volved in a task, and a motivation for choosing one criterion of 
automaticity over another. With such a model in hand, two principles 
can be prescribed for studying automaticity. 
The first of these is that automaticity is a concept best applied to 
components of complex behaviors rather than to behaviors as a whole. 
One should always attempt to analyze a behavior of interest into its 
component processes, and separately study the automaticity of each of 
these processes rather than try to apply the concept to an ensemble of 
processes as a whole (see Newmann (1984) for a related point in the 
context of skill acquisition). In these days of reliance on an information 
processing treatment of cognition, this may seem like a somewhat 
obvious prescription, but it is a prescription that has not been filled 
often enough. 
The second principle concerns the criteria that are used to assess 
automaticity. One should always have a model that specifies the fea- 
tures of component processes that are assumed to accompany the 
development of automaticity. These theoretical features can then serve 
as the basis for identifying criteria that can be used to discriminate 
automatic from nonautomatic processes. These criteria, in turn, typi- 
cally lead quite directly to operational definitions of automaticity in the 
chosen task context. Once again, it may seem obvious that one should 
never proceed to experimentation without being informed by a model, 
but this has not prevented the study of automaticity as a descriptive 
rather than a theoretical concept. 
Let us consider each of these principles in turn. 
Principle 1: Component processes 
Long before psychology became an experimental science, Descartes 
proposed a dualistic view of behavior. According to this view, there was 
one form of behavior, the undulutio rej7exa, that was presumed to be 
elicited by external forces, not driven by an internal will. By contrast, 
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there were other behaviors that had their motivation in internal will, 
guided by the soul. 
There are many aspects of this dualistic theory, of course, that no 
longer have currency. However, it contains a view of behavior that has 
persisted in psychological theory: the dichotomy between automatic 
and voluntary processes. The original conception of this dichotomy, as 
illustrated by Descartes’ theory, was that whole behaviors could be 
classified as either automatic or not. Psychologists who commented on 
automaticity in the late 1800’s and early 1900’s were sympathetic with 
this view. James (1890), for example, described the act of getting 
dressed as if the entire act were subject to automation. Likewise, 
Solomons and Stein (1896) discussed the act of writing as if the entire 
act could be treated as a whole, and be subject to the development of 
automaticity. That these early investigators of cognition considered acts 
as unanalyzable wholes is not particularly surprising, since the concept 
of elemental cognitive processes was still in its infancy. What is more 
surprising is that several current investigations of automaticity have 
persisted in the attempt to study automaticity for entire acts. Of course, 
it is entirely possible that certain complexes of processes are subject to 
the development of automaticity. But we suspect that this is the 
exception, not the rule. 
There are two errors that may occur if one is not analytic about the 
processes that may be subject to automaticity and its development. The 
first, of course, is that one may conclude that a particular behavior is 
not automatic when, in fact, some important components of it may be. 
There is a more insidious error that is possible as well: One may 
conclude that some entire task is automatic, when a careful analysis of 
the components of this task would reveal that some are not automatic 
at all. How could this occur? Our research on frequency judgments, 
presented below, suggests a possibility. In brief, the problem is that 
without a process analysis, one could design experimentation that 
permits task processes to proceed in a manner that is not strained, and 
not influenced by variables that might affect them if they are not 
automatic (see the discussion of the effect of presentation time on 
frequency judgments below). Or one might choose variables that are 
more sensitive to automatic components than to nonautomatic ones. In 
short, one could construct insensitive tests of automaticity without an 
explicit model of the processes involved. (See, e.g., Flexser and Bower 
(1975) and Zacks et al. (1982) for small effects of intention and practice 
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respectively that might have been accentuated given the proper condi- 
tions, thus calling into question the automaticity of frequency estima- 
tion.) Let us examine how this may have occurred in the study of 
frequency estimation. Following this, we shall describe cases in which 
the first potential error may have been omitted: Automaticity may have 
been missed for some component processes in letter and word identifi- 
cation. 
Frequency judgments 
By now, many experiments have shown that subjects, both human and 
infrahuman, are exquisitely sensitive to the frequency of occurrence of 
events in their environments. Evidence from several lines of experimen- 
tal work has been used to support the argument that this sensitivity to 
frequency is a function of an automatic coding and retrieval skill that 
creates memories of the events in question, memories that in turn can 
be used to support judgments of frequency that may be required of 
subjects. The major criteria that have been marshalled in support of the 
automaticity of frequency processing are insensitivity to competing 
demands (Zacks et al. 1982), insensitivity to intentional strategy (Flexser 
and Bower 1975; Howell 1973a, b; Z,acks et al. 1982), insensitivity to 
individual differences (Hasher and Zacks 1979; Zacks et al. 1982), 
insensitivity to practice (Hasher and Chromiak 1977; Zacks et al. 1982), 
and insensitivity to development (Attig and Hasher 1980; Hasher and 
Chromiak 1977; Hasher and Zacks 1979; Kausler and Puckett 1980). 
Is the sheer weight of these criteria sufficient to be convincing about 
the automaticity of frequency processing? Let us first consider the task 
whose automaticity is in question. Subjects in a typical experiment are 
shown a series of slides on each of which there is some item, say a 
word. The number of slides in such a series is typically quite large, 
perhaps 150. After presentation of the series, subjects are given a list of 
the items that were included in the slides, and asked to judge the 
frequency with which each of them occurred. 
This is obviously quite a complex task. First of all, there are several 
options that subjects can use to encode frequency information during 
the time of stimulus presentation. These might include some form of 
counting, whether overt or covert. Or it might be the creation of a 
network in memory which links each presentation of a word with a list 
marker that can later serve as the retrieval mechanism (cf., Anderson 
J. Jonides et al. / Assessing automaticity 161 
and Bower 1972). Whatever the coding strategy, it is clear that there are 
options that may be exercised differentially depending on the condi- 
tions of the experiment (e.g., length of list, encoding time). 
Consider the retrieval task as well. Subjects might try to use their 
feelings of the subjective strength of a memory trace as the basis on 
which to produce a frequency judgment. Or, they may have available a 
multiplicity of created codes as an index of how often an item occurred. 
Yet still, there may be an actual numerical code that may have been 
stored as the basis of judgment. Whatever the strategy, there are 
options. And various studies in the literature have suggested the viabil- 
ity of one or another of these options in different experimental contexts 
(see, e.g., Hintzman (1976) and Howell (1973a, b) for reviews). In 
addition to these coding and retrieval strategies, there may be some 
variety in retention strategies as well. With all these options potentially 
available to subjects, is it possible that the entire task of coding, storing, 
and retrieving frequency is automatic? Unlikely. From Bryan and 
Harter (1897) to Shiffrin and Schneider (1977), one principle about the 
development of automaticity has been clear: There needs to be little 
variability in the conditions of execution of an act in order for auto- 
maticity to develop and maintain itself. With this in mind, there seems 
little chance that a skill as potentially complex as judging frequency 
could be automatic, when viewed as a whole. 
The case against the automaticity of frequency processing is 
strengthened by reexamination of the criteria that have been amassed in 
its support. One source of data relevant to this reexamination is a series 
of experiments by Naveh-Benjamin and Jonides (1985). 
In one experiment, Naveh-Benjamin and Jonides (1985) examined 
whether frequency judgments were, in fact, unaffected by competing 
task demands. The case that Zacks et al. (1982) had made for this claim 
rested on the fact that subjects who were told to expect both a 
frequency test and a free recall test gave frequency judgments that were 
indistinguishable from those from subjects who were led to expect just 
a frequency test. The rationale was that uncertainty about which test 
would be upcoming would produce competing task demands. This is a 
weak manipulation, however, since there is no direct way of calibrating 
the task demands of these expectations. Instead, Naveh-Benjamin and 
Jonides (1985) opted for the more traditional approach of a dual task 
methodology, in which a secondary task varied systematically in its 
required processing demands. In this experiment, subjects had to en- 
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gage in a counting task that varied in difficulty during presentation of 
words whose frequency had to be judged later on. The results of the 
experiment were unequivocal: Increased processing demand of the 
secondary task led to a decline in the discriminability and accuracy of 
the frequency judgments, and to an increase in their variability. 
In another experiment in this same series, Naveh-Benjamin and 
Jonides examined the claim that frequency judgments are unaffected by 
intention to code frequency. The literature is somewhat mixed on the 
effect of this variable. There have been reports of a difference between 
incidental and intentional instructions with respect to frequency coding 
(Fisk and Schneider 1984; Greene 1984). However, some investigators 
have found no effect of this manipulation (Flexser and Bower 1975; 
Howell 1973a, b). One problem with failures to find an effect of 
intention, discussed by Greene (1984), is that incidental instructions 
have not fully separated incidental memorization of the material from 
incidental coding of frequency. A second reason for the controversy is 
that strategy effects may show themselves only in the earliest stages of 
the encoding process (Fisk and Schneider 1984). The experiment that 
addressed these hypotheses included variation in whether subjects in- 
tended to code frequency of occurrence for words in a list as well as 
variation in the presentation time for each of the words. At a presenta- 
tion time of four seconds, there was no effect of intention to code 
frequency. However, at presentation times shorter than this, intention 
resulted in judgments that discriminated better among the actual fre- 
quencies, that were less extreme in their underestimation of the actual 
frequencies, and that were less variable than judgments made under 
incidental learning instructions. 
So it seems that the criteria of insensitivity to capacity demand and 
insensitivity to intentional coding strategy do not hold up under closer 
scrutiny. Likewise, Greene (1984) has commented critically on the other 
criteria that have been used to assess the automaticity of frequency 
coding as well. The principal reason for the discrepancy between these 
recent experiments and the previous examinations of automaticity 
concerns the domain in which the criteria have been applied. Previous 
studies used fairly coarse applications of criteria to assess automaticity, 
coarse in the sense that the criteria were applied to the whole task of 
judging frequency, rather than to its individual components, In combi- 
nation with some insensitivity in the criteria, such an application of the 
criteria to whole task performances may have left this enterprise 
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vulnerable to inappropriate acceptance of the null hypothesis: auto- 
matic processing. The recent reports of Fisk and Schneider (1984) 
Greene (1984) and Naveh-Benjamin and Jonides (1985) apply criteria 
to assess automaticity in a way that isolates individual processes 
somewhat more finely. This is, of course, consistent with the prescrip- 
tion that individual processes are the proper referent for the concept of 
automaticity. 
In the Naveh-Benjamin and Jonides (1985) experiments, isolation of 
processes was achieved by manipulating variables that have their effect 
directly at the time of stimulus presentation. During this time, subjects 
are encoding each word and updating the information that will be the 
basis for later frequency judgments. The load and presentation time 
variables were manipulated such that they could have an immediate 
impact on the process of encoding each word and updating the frequency 
dependent code. Our results suggest that this updating may not be 
automatic, by standard criteria. 
Take note that we are not arguing that frequency coding as a whole 
is not automatic. This argument is inappropriate since frequency coding 
is too complex a process to assess as a whole. There may be compo- 
nents of it that are automatic, and components of it that are not. Or 
there may be some strategies of frequency coding that have embedded 
in them sub-processes that are subject to automaticity. In fact, there 
could be sub-processes involved in frequency coding that have an 
automatic character. This may be suggested by the fact that even in the 
most demanding capacity and presentation conditions in the experi- 
ments by Naveh-Benjamin and Jonides (1985), frequency judgments 
still had some fidelity. All of this suggests that there may indeed be 
automatic processes implicated. These should be isolated and subjected 
to further test. 
Encoding letters and words 
Let us now turn to examination of a second kind of error that is 
possible in assessing automaticity. The error here is that investigation of 
a task as a whole may lead one to conclude that the task is not 
performed automatically, when one or more of the component processes 
used in completing the task may, in fact, be automatic by acceptable 
criteria. This issue arises most prominently in several recent demonstra- 
tions that purport to disconfirm the automaticity of perceptual processes 
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occurring early in word and letter perception (Francolini and Egeth 
1980; Hoffman et al. 1980; Johnston and Dark 1982; Kahneman and 
Henik 1977; Regan 1981) [l]. All of these demonstrations share a 
feature in common, a feature that is best illustrated by examining two 
of the phenomena in question. 
The first example is a phenomenon documented in a series of 
experiments by Kahneman and Henik (1977). In one condition of their 
experiment 2, subjects had to report the ink color of a word that 
appeared in a circle located unpredictably to the left or right of 
fixation. On the other side of fixation there appeared another word that 
was surrounded by a square. Either of the two words could be neutral 
with respect to the color response that was required (e.g., shoe), 
compatible with the response (e.g., red, if the color of the word in the 
circle was red), or incompatible (e.g., red, if the ink color of the word in 
the circle was green). Subjects were instructed to remain fixated in the 
center of the display between the two words at all times. 
The main result of the experiment is adequately described by consid- 
ering three conditions. When both words were neutral with respect to 
the ink color to be named, mean RT was 906 msec. When the word 
whose ink color was to be named was itself an incompatible ink name, 
mean RT was 1108 msec when the other word in the display was 
neutral. This, of course, is the classical effect described by Stroop 
(1935). When the word whose ink was to be named was itself neutral 
but the other word was an ink color which conflicted with the required 
response, response time was 956 msec. So there was interference caused 
by the word whose ink color was not in question, although the inter- 
ference was less than in the condition in which the conflicting word was 
itself the word whose ink was to be named. Kahneman and Henik 
(1977) reasoned that this asymmetry in the amount of Stroop inter- 
ference compromises the conclusion that word encoding is automatic. If 
it were, then there should have been automatic encoding of both words, 
and equal interference caused by both. 
Before discussing the implications of this experiment, let us consider 
[l] Paap and Ogden (1981) also report evidence that seemingly disconfirms the automaticity of 
early encoding processes for letters, however the procedure used in their experiments is subject to 
the methodological criticisms outlined by Jonides and Mack (1984). 
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a second set of experiments by Francolini and Egeth (1980) that 
purports to disconfirm the hypothesis that early encoding processes are 
automatic. Francolini and Egeth (1980) had subjects count the number 
of red letters that appeared in a display. Also present in each display 
were a number of black characters, either letters or digits. The issue 
addressed by this experiment was whether the black items would 
interfere with the subjects’ task of reporting the number of red letters 
that were presented. To assess such interference, Francolini and Egeth 
(1980) had the black items sometimes be digits that did not correspond 
to the correct answer about the number of letters. For example, if there 
were three red letters present in a display, there may have been two 
instances of the digit ‘2’ in black ink as well. Compared to the 
presentation of black letters among red letters, this arrangement creates 
a situation somewhat analogous to Stroop’s (1935). However, Fran- 
colini and Egeth (1980) found that there was no significant interference 
from the black digits. They reasoned that if the encoding of digits is 
automatic, there should have been interference from the black digits, 
analogous to the standard Stroop task. Since they found no such 
interference, they concluded that the encoding of digits must not be 
automatic. 
How do we interpret these effects and the other reports of failures to 
detect automaticity in encoding (Hoffman et al. 1980; Johnston and 
Dark 1982; Regan 1981)? The feature that all these lines of research 
share in common is that subjects either have uncertainty about the 
location of the focal stimulus, or their attention is intentionally diverted 
from the stimulus whose automaticity of processing is being assessed 
(Johnston and Dark 1982). In the Kahneman and Henik (1977) experi- 
ment, for example, the words were shown off the fovea, and subjects 
had to shift attention to the requisite word. In the Francolini and Egeth 
(1980) case, the red letters were in unpredictable locations. In all of the 
cited cases, in fact, it seems plausible to suppose that an attention- 
switching component was required in addition to the encoding compo- 
nent whose automaticity is in question. Suppose, for example, that 
subjects did process words and letters automatically. Once processed, 
however, there could be a late selection of categorized items for 
purposes of preparing a response (see Van Der Heijden (1984) for 
support of this model). This second process may be quite effortful and 
subject to voluntary control. Nevertheless, the first, encoding, may still 
be automatic. Such a model seems a plausible account of many of the 
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phenomena reported in the literature cited above, including those of 
Kahneman and Henik (1977) and Francolini and Egeth (1980) [2]. 
Or turn things around. Suppose attention has its effect quite early, in 
selecting which aspects of a display will be the focus of further 
processing. This may be a nonautomatic process, but, once chosen, the 
attended stimuli may nevertheless be processed completely automati- 
cally. This model may also account for some of the phenomena in 
question (e.g., Francolini and Egeth 1980). Under this scenario, we 
wouldn’t want to conclude that encoding is not automatic. By analogy, 
consider the effect of giving a visually farsighted observer corrective. 
glasses with which to view a Stroop display (a nonautomatic interven- 
tion). This would surely increase the effectiveness of the Stroop effect, 
but we wouldn’t want to conclude from this that the Stroop effect is not 
automatic. 
Let us be clear that we are not advocating one of these models over 
another for any particular one of these phenomena. What we are 
advocating is that investigators be more process-oriented in their analy- 
sis of tasks; this could lead to greater sensitivity to alternative interpre- 
tations of the sort sketched above. 
The danger in all of the cases we have considered is to conceive of 
tasks as consisting of a single unitary encoding process. Considered as 
such, the authors are right: The entire tasks are not automatic. But if 
we partition each task into an attention directing process and an 
encoding process, then we may ask separately about the automaticity of 
each. When partitioned this way, we may not need to abandon the idea 
that early letter and word processes are automatic. 
Reviewing the research on frequency judgments and early encoding 
processes highlights the importance of the first principle described 
above: The concept of automaticity is most productively applied to 
component processes, not to entire complex behaviors. How does one 
apply this principle, however? Of course, the first requirement is that a 
process model be developed for any given task that can serve as a guide 
to the components that may be of interest with respect to the issue of 
automaticity. For many of the tasks that have been the focus of 
automaticity research, models already exist that have substantial sup- 
[2] It is also a potentially appealing account of the dilution effect reported by Kahneman and 
Chajczyk (1983). 
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port on which to rest. So an analysis of component processes is quite 
feasible already. 
The second requirement is that experimental methods must be de- 
vised by which to test for the automaticity of any given component. 
This can be quite a difficult undertaking, depending upon the extent to 
which the process of interest can be isolated from others that may 
participate in task performance. 
The third requirement is that one must choose the criteria that are to 
be applied to assess automaticity, and choose the particular way in 
which these criteria will be operationalized in any given task context. 
This third requirement is the focus of the second principle that we 
advocate in the study of automaticity. 
Principle 2: Criteria 
What are the necessary and sufficient conditions for identifying an 
automatic process? The literature that dates back to James (1890) lists 
several possible candidates, all of which, in one context or another, 
coincide with our intuitions about the nature of automaticity and with 
formal theories that have been proposed about automaticity and its 
development (Schneider and Shiffrin 1977). Of the candidates that have 
been proposed, perhaps the ones most frequently cited are that auto- 
matic processes should be free from demands on processing capacity 
and inflexible - in the sense that voluntary control does not markedly 
alters them. But these are not the only criteria that have been cited, as 
illustrated by the list used in the study of frequency coding. How do we 
choose among these various candidates? 
One possibility is to declare that the issue is a definitional one. 
Several investigators seemed to have adopted this stance. In fact, many 
investigators cite other investigators as the reference sources for the 
criteria that they have chosen to use, much as a dictionary uses words 
to define other words. One problem with this strategy is that since 
definitional issues are not subject to empirical scrutiny, different inves- 
tigators could define different sets of criteria as crucial. In fact, this is 
largely what has happened, although tacitly so. The choice of criteria 
seems to have become subject to principles of democracy, with individ- 
ual investigators voting for their favorite candidates. This does not, 
168 J. Jonides et al. / Assessing automaticity 
however, seem to be an appropriate domain for the democratic process 
to prevail. 
Rather, there is an alternative principle to guide the choice of criteria 
for automaticity. This is that the choice of criteria should depend on the 
examination of a processing model of the task in question, and the 
presumed change in processes that attends the development of auto- 
maticity. A well-articulated model will specify the component processes 
involved in a task. This will itself suggest criteria that can be used to 
assess whether processes have been altered during the presumed devel- 
opment of automaticity, or possibly it will suggest the features of- 
performance that ought to be exhibited by an automatic process in the 
model. These criteria can then be instantiated in operational definitions 
specific to the task context. This approach is exemplified in various 
lines of research, beginning with the work of Schneider and Shiffrin 
(1977). A case in point is a series of experiments by Naveh-Benjamin 
and Jonides (1984) concerned with maintenance rehearsal. Let us 
briefly examine this research since it provides an illustration of how a 
process model can provide a compelling reason to favor certain criteria 
over others. 
Developments in memory theory since the proposal of a levels of 
processing framework by Craik and Lockhart (1972) have led to the 
view that there are two separately identifiable sorts of rehearsal. One 
has been called elaborative rehearsal, the process by which information 
in a short-term store is recoded so as to produce a longer-term trace. 
The other type of rehearsal has been called maintenance rehearsal, 
referring to rote repetition. Elaborative rehearsal has been characterized 
as an effortful process that frequently involves quite conscious strate- 
gies, while maintenance rehearsal is seen to be more automatic in 
character. 
Based on prior experimental work, Naveh-Benjamin and Jonides 
(1984) hypothesized that maintenance rehearsal comprises two sub- 
processes, consistent with Baddeley and Hitch’s (1974) view of short- 
term memory as a central processor and an articulatory loop. As 
applied to maintenance rehearsal, the central processor is responsible 
for retrieval of an articulatory code of the verbal material that is to be 
rehearsed. The second sub-process, which includes the use of an articu- 
latory loop, involves the repetitive execution of this code, which results 
in the recycling that is characteristic of this type of rehearsal. The first 
sub-process, the retrieval of the code, was hypothesized to be a process 
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that is less automatic than the loop since it involves potentially effortful 
search through memory. The recycling of the retrieved material, by 
contrast, was hypothesized to be quite automatic in character. This view 
led to the test of three plausible differences between the two presumed 
sub-processes of maintenance rehearsal: The second sub-process should 
be less demanding of resources than the first. Second, once initiated, it 
should be less susceptible to interruption by competing activity that 
interfered with the act of articulation. And third, as maintenance 
rehearsal progressed, the articulations themselves should become more 
and more stereotyped, since they are presumed to resemble a tapere- 
corder loop. These three criteria, demand on capacity, susceptibility to 
interruption, and stereotypy, served as tests of the automaticity of the 
second sub-process relative to the first, and relative to elaborative 
rehearsal. The experiments that implemented these criteria showed a 
nice convergence among them: The later portions of maintenance 
rehearsal were more automatic in character than the first, and than any 
portion of elaborative rehearsal. Of concern to us here is the choice of 
criteria that were used in this research. The ones chosen were motivated 
by the particular theoretical view of maintenance rehearsal that was 
hypothesized. Note that one of the criteria by this choice, stereotypy, is 
somewhat atypical of those that appear in the automaticity literature. 
Yet it was motivated by virtue of the model that was adopted. 
We should note that there is one potentially troubling aspect of this 
second principle for assessing automaticity. The idea at the core of this 
principle is that models of processing ought to inform us about the 
characteristics of automaticity in any particular context. Does this 
imply that there is really no unified concept of automaticity that cuts 
across the particular tasks and paradigms that appear in the literature? 
It is too early to tell. It is intriguing, however, that similar criteria recur 
quite frequently in many studies of automaticity. The central ones that 
recur most often are light demand on capacity, and insensitivity to 
voluntary control. It could be that these features recur only because 
they are the most frequent ones that are tested. Rather, though, their 
recurrence may be a function of the frequently implicit intuitions of 
investigators about the most appropriate characteristics in their particu- 
lar tasks. To investigate whether these characteristics do have some 
transsituationality, though, there has to be more systematicity in the 
choice of criteria, and in the motivation for these criteria. 
Application of the two principles that have been discussed will 
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promote an assessment of whether the concept of automaticity has 
value beyond any task context. Analysis of performance into compo- 
nent processes will allow us to apply our knowledge about the auto- 
maticity of these processes to various different task performances in 
which these processes participate. Coupled with a better motivated 
choice of criteria to assess automaticity, this research strategy should 
allow us to better generalize the study of automaticity across tasks. 
In his 1890 Principles, James remarked that ‘If an act became no 
easier after being done several times, if the careful direction of consci- 
ousness were necessary to its accomplishment on each occasion, it is 
evident that the whole activity of a lifetime might be confined to one or 
two deeds - that no progress could take place in development’. James 
was talking about automaticity in this passage. Let us hope that he was 
also not talking about the study of automaticity. 
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